Capital Defense Journal
Volume 16

Issue 1

Article 3

Fall 9-1-2003

Life's Uncertainties: How to Deal with Cooperating Witnesses and
Jailhouse Snitches
C. Blaine Elliott

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
C. Blaine Elliott, Life's Uncertainties: How to Deal with Cooperating Witnesses and Jailhouse Snitches, 16
Cap. DEF J. 1 (2003).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol16/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington and Lee
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an
authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information,
please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Life's Uncertainties:
How to Deal with Cooperating Witnesses
and Jailhouse Snitches
C Blaine Elliott
I. Intmr

n

On April 9, 2003, Earl Bramblett was electrocuted in Viginia's electric
chair.' Bramblett was convicted of the 1994 murder of a family of four.'
Bramblett maintained his innocence until death, proclaiming in his final statement that he" 'didn't murder the Hodges family.'"' 3 During Bramblett's trial,
key testimony came from Tracy Turner, Bramblett's fellow inmate.' Turner
testified that Bramblett confessed to killing the Hodges familyto him and told
him that he was" 'addicted to little girls.'" After the trial, Turner recanted his
testimony and admitted that he had lied.6 The defense claims that most of the
evidence external to Turner's testimonywas circumstantial.7 Unfortunately, due
to the finality of an execution based largely on what may have been false testimony, the actual truth about the Hodges family murders may never be revealed.
Throughout history, the person who betrayed his friends and associates by
informing is almost always "reviled."' However, the premise that the effective
*
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assistance. The author would also like to thank a large network of friends and family for their love,
support, and patience. Lastly, the author would like to thank the all-night staff of Stop In Food
Store No. 78 for being awake and supplied with candy bars and coffee.
1. Bill Baskervill, V,& Exeat ManforFarits SkarA ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 9, 2003,
1,at 2003 WL 18223466 (reporting on Bramblett's execution).

2.

Maria Glod, G

Vz,Man

C hzir, WASK POST, Apr. 8, 2003, at B3
edwte

(reporting on the controversy surrounding Bramblett's execution), auzil at 2003 WL 17426706.
3. Baskervill s ranote 1, 1, 3.
5, at
4. Cwmdcai V*ia Killer Diz inElrtyic Chtir, REUrERS, Apr. 9, 2003,
http.J/www.carkprosecutor.org/html/death/L)/brambltt845.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2003)

(reporting on the circumstances surrounding Bramblett's execution).
5.

Id

6.

Id

7. Id
8. Michael A.Simons, ReribamfjrRaa: Cwpenan Pwshnvm4adAtni 56 VAN.
L. REv. 1, 2 (2003) (referencing the terms "rat," "snitch," "tattletale," and "whistle-blower").
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ness of our criminal justice system depends on jailhouse snitches and cooperating witnesses is long-standing.' Prosecutors regularly offer criminal defendants
leniency in exchange for incriminating testimony about their cellmates, friends
and acquaintances.'" This testimony is inherently unreliable and unique in that
it lies solely in the hands of the prosecutor. Only the prosecutor can screen
against the false or misleading testimony provided by snitches.
"Cooperation has never been more prevalent than it is today."" The use
of snitches has caused increased concern over the last fifteen years.12 A3variety
of changes within the criminal justice system have caused this increase.'
This article will offer reforms in three areas. First, there must be a new
wave of remedies tied to pre-trial, trial, and post-trial proceedings. Second, there
needs to be a systematic collection of data regarding snitch and cooperating
witness testimony. Finally, this article will propose a collection of structural
reforms within the prosecutorial system itself.
IL Reaszn BdAind the Pudenx of CeratiwTestimu
Mandatory minimum sentences and the use of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are two significant causes for the increase in cooperative testimony.'
The cooperation system, as it currently exists, took shape with the adoption of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") in 1987. " Before the Guidelines, judges possessed wide discretion when determining sentences.16 Now, a
"defendant's sentencing range is determined bycombining a mathematical score
Simons also notes the media's portrayal of informants, or cooperators, as "disloyal, deceitful, greedy,
selfish, and weak." Id
9. See id at 6 (noting that the cooperation system has been around for centuries).
10. See id at 2 (noting that the cooperation system has flourished because it offers benefits

to prosecutors in terms of information and to cooperators in the form of leniency).
11. Id at 3.
12. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Introduction, 7he Qqwrati W'ams Ca wrr IsJutirrChrage.
23 CARDoZOL. REv. 747,749 (2002) [hereinafter Yaroshefsky, I tiaian] (outlining the concerns
surrounding the use of cooperating witnesses in the criminal justice system).
13. Id
14. Se U.S. SENTENaNG GUIDELrNES MANUAL S 5K1.1 (2002) (permitting a departure'

from sentencing guidelines for defendants who provide "substantial assistance" inthe investigation
and prosecution of another who has committed an offense); 18 U.S.C S3553 (2002) (permitting
the court, "[u]pon motion of the Government," to impose a sentence below the mandatory
minimum "so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense").
15. Simons, sura note 8, at 7-8.
16. Id at 8. Prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, "most federal crimes only provided a

maximum sentence." Id Judges were free to consider many factors other than the seriousness of
the crime when determining the proper sentence. Id These factors included: "[Ciriminal history,
age, education, employment, family background, family responsibilities, charitable works, health,
history of substance abuse, behavior at trial, assistance to the authorities, remorse, or any other
factor that the judge considered relevant." Id at 9.
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for the seriousness of the offense with a mathematical score for the defendant's
criminal history." 7 Judges are no longer allowed to consider an individual
offender's characteristics in sentencing.' Not onlyhave the Guidelines limited
sentencing discretion, but mandatory minimums have increased the severity of
the sentences. 9 Mandatory minimum sentences and the Sentencing Guidelines
have taken sentencing discretion away from the judiciary and put it in the hands
of the prosecution. 0 These changes have raised the stakes for defendants and
increased their motivation to cooperate.21
Prosecutors often use mandatory minimums and the Guidelines as a tool
to compel cooperation from defendants who are potential witnesses.' The
Guidelines allow a court to reduce a mandatory sentence in consideration of the
following: (1) the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance,
according to the Government's evaluation; (2) the accuracy, thoroughness, and
reliabilityof the testimony, (3)the nature and extent of the assistance; (4) anyrisk
of injuryto the defendant or his family, and (5)the timeliness of the assistance.23
The Guidelines provide a defendant with three basic choices: she mayplead not
guilty, guilty, or choose to plead guilty while cooperating, which will, in all
likelihood, greatly reduce or eliminate her jailtime.24 Defendants asked to
cooperate almost always choose to do so.2" The defendant is usually advised by
everyone to cooperate- including prosecutors, lawenforcement agents, defense
counsel, co-defendants, fellow inmates, and jailors. 6 The Guidelines essentially
make cooperation necessaryto avoid extensive incarceration. "To manydefendants, cooperation has become synonymous with hope."27
III. Singleton I ariII
Jailhouse snitches and cooperating witnesses are inherently suspect witnesses. Jailhouse snitches have something very important at stake- their
17. Id at 9.
18. Id
19. Id at 10.
20. Id at 8-9, 12.
21. Simons, sup-anote 8, at 13-14 (describing cooperation as the onlymajor sentencing factor
that the defendant has any control over and how cooperation is often a defendant's only chance at
a significantly reduced sentence).
tamitor, 23 CARDOZOL REV.
22. Steven M. Cohen, Wat is Tnru PmpaIiu afaFmr'Pr
818-19 (2002) (citing U.S. SENTENaNG GUADEU1NES MANUAL S 5K1.1(a) (2002)).
23. U.S. SENTENaNG GUIDELUNES MANUAL S 5K1.1(a).
24. Se Cohen, supra note 22, at 819 (explaining that, of these three choices, guilty with
cooperation is the only rational choice for most defendants).
25. Id at 819-20.
26. Id at 820.
27. Id
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freedom. Prosecutors can offer reduced sentences, as well as many other
rewards, in exchange for their testimony. Therefore, these witnesses have every
reason to lie.
In 1998 a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

decided in Sirtnv UmiWlSttw

("SieCkn/') that 18 U.S.C. 5 201(c)(2), a

federal bribery statute, prohibited prosecutors from offering leniency deals for
testimony in criminal trials. 9 In the case, Singleton's accomplice, Napoleon
Douglas ("Douglas"), testified against Singleton at her trial for cocaine distribution and moneylaundering.30 Prosecutors offered Douglas a pre-trial agreement
of leniency in exchange for testimony against Singleton." Singleton was convicted, but the Tenth Carcuit panel reversed the decision and ordered a new
trial. 2 The court stated that its grounds for reversal were that Douglas's plea
agreement constituted a violation of 18 U.S.C S 201(c)(2), which reads that
"whoever... promises anything of value... for ... testimony" is guilty of a
felony punishable bytwo years in prison." The three-judge panel of the Tenth
Circuit essentiallydeclared that plea agreements for leniencyconstituted out and
out bribery. 4
The keyissues that the S&#emI panel decided included the following: "1)
whether the word whoever induded government officials and prosecutors, and
2) whether an offer of leniency was 'anything of value.' "" The panel decided
that, according to plain language, the word "whoever" included federal prosecutors.3 6 The panel did recognize two classes of statutes that do not apply to the
government. First, statutes do not applythat "deprive the sovereign of a 'recognized or established prerogative title or interest.'""7 The second class of statutes
that are not applicable to the government are those whose application to the
government would create an absurdity." The panel decided that a statute that
28.
29.

144 F.3d 1343 (10th Car. 1998).
United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1348 (10th Car. 1998) [hereinafter Sirm1],
zden/bmc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cr. 1999) [hereinafterSirI1], wrtt d
527 US. 1024 (1999);
see 18 U.S.C S 201(c) (2002) (prohibiting bribery of public officials and witnesses).
30. Sikw I, 144 F.3d at 1344.
31.
d
32. Id at 1343.
33. Id at 1345, 1360.
34. See id at 1348 (holding that 18 US.C S 201(c)(2), a federal bribery staute, prohibited
prosecutors from offering leniencydeals for testimonyin criminal trials). The panel also stated that
"(p]rornising something of value to secure truthful testimony is as much prohibited as buying
perjured testimony." Id at 1358.

35.

Bryan S. GowdyLeieyBi!w: Imt45if

dFei~alraaicf~

f

Lenienryfr Tesdnmn)

60 LA. L. REV. 447, 451 (2000) (citing Sigkn 1, 144 F.3d at 1348).
36. S arI, 144 F.3d at 1348.
37. Id. at 1346 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 383 (1937)).
38.
d
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would restrict an agent of the government, but not the government itself, is
enforceable against the agent. 9 The panel also decided that a statute designed
to prevent "fraud, injury, or wrong" is enforceable against the government."'
The panel in S&& =Idecided that S201(c)(2) satisfied this purpose because it
"operates to prevent fraud upon the federal courts in the form of inherently
unreliable testimony."4' The panel also found that S 201(c)(2) did not create an
absurdity.42 Rather, the panel in S&@etcIdeterined that 5 201(c)(2)'s application to leniency deals byprosecutors was a central concept in the American legal
tradition.43
Next, the court addressed whether an offer of leniency constituted "anything of value."" The test the panel employed was "whether the recipient
subjectively attaches value to the thing received."4" The panel found that other
courts had held intangible things such as conjugal visits, information regarding
the location of a witness, assistance in arranging a merger, and information in a
DEA report to be "things of value."' In addition to its determination of the
value of leniency, the panel also found that Congress's purpose in creating the
bribery statute was "to keep testimony free of all influence so that its truthfulness is protected."47
The media hailed Sbkm I as a legal" 'bombshell.' 4 Criminal defense
attorneys heralded the decision as long overdue and flooded federal courts with
"Sir o' motions.49 Several courts followed the Tenth Crcuit panel and
entertained these "Siq u motions.' The Tenth Crcuit, en banc, quickly
reversed the panel's decision."' The United States Courts of Appeals for the
39. Id
40. id
41.
Id
42. Sig/uI, 144 F.3d at 1348.
43. Id at 1347-48.
44. Id at 1348.
45. Id at 1349.
46. Id
47. Id at 1350.
48. JeffreyM. Schumn, Caprs Rush toEx&rsb Singleton, BtAre dxEntis qftdx Pod's
Dx~iai Still G/otdre., 27 FA. ST. U.L REV. 325, 325 (1999) (quotingJmudiz Tmu* WASI-L POST,
July 8, 1998, at A16).
49. Id at 326.
50. Se id at 326-27 n.13 (citing United States v. Mays, No. 97-CR. 127 (ED. Tenn. 1998);
United States v. Lowery, 15 F. Supp. 2d 1348,1354 (SD. FL 1998), edd,166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cr.
1999); United States v. Fraguela, No. Cz.m.A 96-0339, 1998 WL 560352, at *1 (ED.La. Aug. 27,
1998), onier i ~amwidffati, No. Cim. A.96-339, 1998 WL 910219, at *1 (ED.La. Oct. 7,
1998); United States v. Revis, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1242 (ND. Okla. 1998)).
51.
Sir#ran , 165 F.3d at 1297. The three judges from the original panel (Judges Kelly,
Ebel, and Chief Judge Seymour) stayed fast to their decision in a dissent written by Judge Kelly.
Sitn I, 165 F.3d at 1308 (Kelly,J., dissenting).
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Fourth and the Fifth Circuits promptly rejected Sv% on Ion the basis of plain
eror." The Fifth Circuit stated that it has "consistently... upheld government
efforts to provide benefits to witnesses in exchange for testimony." 3 The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh,
and D.C Crcuits all followed suit and rejected S km L' District courts
responded en masse, following S4tonI/'s lead in fashioning "hypertechnical
and conflicting arguments to counter" the S&Veton I decision." In short, the
federal judiciary struck down Si&Vrn /'s holding that offering leniency to
criminal defendants in exchange for testimony constitutes bribery and violates
201(c)(2).
However, the one issue from S&et
I that all of these courts left unaddressed is that "[g]overnment leniency in exchange for testimony can create a
powerful incentive to lie and derail the truth-seeking purpose of the criminal
justice system." 6 There is little doubt that a system of rewards for testimony
offers a real incentive to lie. Given the inherent unreliability of bought testimony, there is a reasonableness to the panel's opinion in Sir&on I that signals
a need for reform in our current system of handling cooperative testimony.

IV. DDo
Evidentiaryscrutinymust be held to an even higher standard in capital cases
due to the irrevocable nature of the punishment. The United States Supreme
Court established the concept that death is different in Wodson v North
Card/n . The Court held that North Carolina's mandatory death sentence was
unconstitutional based on "the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively
different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long.""8 Due to the fact
that death is different, "there is a corresponding difference in the need for

52. Sw Schurmm, stpm note 48, at 327 n.15 (listing cases from the Fourth and Fifth Crcuits
of the United States Courts of Appeals that rejected Sikw I on the basis of plain error).
53.
United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 1998).
54. Se United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 418-19 (6th Cir. 1998) (disagreeing with the
Siavcn Ipanel on whether "whoever" includes the government); United States v. Condon, 170
F3d 687,688-89 (7th Cr. 1999) (holding that statute does not require exclusion of Government
proffered testimony obtained through promises of immunity); United States v. Johnson, 169 F.3d
1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that 18 U.S.C S 201(c)(2) cannot be read to bar plea agreements
in exchange for testimony); United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119,1124 (11th Cr. 1999) (holding
that plea agreements in exchange for cooperation and testimonydoes not violate the federal bribery
statute); United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d 980,987 (D.C Cir. 1999) (reasoning that the repeated
rejection of Sig/v I allowed plea agreements without violation of the bribery statute).
55. Schumm, supra note 48, at 327-28.
56. Si#am II, 165 F.3d at 1310 (Kelly, J.,
dissenting) (reiterating the policy behind the
panel's original decision).
57. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US. 280,305 (1975).
58.
Id
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reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case." 9
This need for reliabilityhighlights the problems inherent in jailhouse snitch
testimony. The testimonyof informants who have received deals from prosecutorial agencies is suspicious from the outset. The use of such testimony in
capital trials presents exactlythe kind of danger addressed bythe Wodson court.
Death is different, and it requires a heightened evidentiary standard, particularly
when jailhouse snitch testimonyis involved. A man who has been convicted and
executed for capital murder based on snitch testimony may be exonerated;
however, exoneration will have arrived too late.
V. M&dxs jCHarlingldrxnryUWdiale Tstmny
Due to the Guidelines and minimum sentencing requirements, the use of
jailhouse snitch and cooperating witness testimony has exploded. 6° Common
sense suggests that a witness who is alreadyincarcerated, has a trial pending, or
maysoon be indicted has more incentive to lie in favor of the prosecution, which
is in a position to offer her some benefit, than to testify in a manner favorable
to the defendant. Combine this basic intuitive step with evidence that informant
"buying" ordeal-making is a tool commonlyused byprosecutors and there is an
obvious problem- the criminal justice system is being fueled by "inherently
unreliable testimony."6 ' Add this problem of unreliable testimonyto the immeasurable import of a capital murder trial, in which the penalty for a wrongful
conviction based on false testimony may be irrevocable, and the urgent need for
reforms within the criminal justice system regarding jailhouse snitch and cooperating witness testimony becomes apparent.
A. Remnzz Bqom After, andat Trial
The first step a criminal defense lawyer should take in any case, but especiallythose in which jailhouse snitch testimony may be used, is to file a Motion
for Timely Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence.62 Attorneys should make this
59.
60.
61.

Id
Simons, s"pra note 8, at 14.
SeeSchumm, supra note 48, at 328 n.17 (quoting Mark Curriden, Cot toDcideLeglity
cfReum gIjbmmis Experns Say 7Tcarz* qCza Cs BeJemanhz DALLAS MORNING NEVS,
Nov. 17, 1998, at 1A, awIlaWe at 1998 WL 13118618). In his article, Curriden stated:
More than 86 percent of a sampling of federal criminal cases in Dallas and Fort Worth
between 1995" and 1997 involved the use of informants and co-conspirators who
received deals from prosecutors in return for testimony.... Some of the informants
were paid thousands of dollars for their cooperation. Most received a reduction in the
amount of time they would serve in prison for their crimes.
Curriden, at 1A.
62. See, eg, MOnON FOR TIMELY DIsaOsuRE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE, a ilahe at
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motion pursuant to the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution, Bradyv Marjard'and its progeny.64 In Virginia, the
motion should also be made pursuant to sections Eight and Eleven of Article I

of the Constitution of Virginia. 5 This motion requests exculpatory evidence be

delivered to the defense as required by Brady." Brady held that suppression of
http://vc3.org/ (containing a motion requesting the disclosure of exculpatory evidence prepared
by the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse at Washington & Lee University School of Law). The
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse also has a copy of this motion on file. Please call (540) 4588557 for a copy of this motion.
63. 373 US. 83 (1963).
64. Siv U.S. CODT. amend. VI (guaranteeing the defendant's right to confront witnesses);
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (protecting the defendant from cruel and unusual punishment); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (guaranteeing that the defendant's rights are not to be abridged by the states);
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the prosecution's suppression of evidence
favorable to the defendant, after the defendant requests that evidence, is a due process violation,
regardless of the evidence's bearing on guilt or innocence); swalsoStricklerv. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,
289-90 (1999) (stating that the question of whether the suppressed evidence would have more than
likely produced a different verdict is not material, and that whether the defendant received a fair
trial, meaning a trial whose verdict is worthy of confidence, is the true test of materiality); Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 US. 419,434 (1995) (stating that the effect of suppressed Bnrdyevidence needs to be
considered, rather than the individual items of evidence, and that, in a capital murder trial, the
suppressed evidence would have made a different result "reasonablyprobable"); United States v.
Bagley, 473 US. 667, 676-78 (1985) (stating that impeachment evidence, as well as exculpatory
evidence, needs to be disclosed, and that reversal of a conviction is required only if the suppression
of the evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of the triaD; Giglio v. United States, 405
US. 150, 154 (1972) (stating that a promise not to prosecute in exchange for cooperation made by
a government attorney is attributable to the Government, even if the attorney had no authority to
make such a promise and did not communicate the promise to the government attorneywho tried
the case; therefore, a violation of that promise constitutes a violation of due process and requires
a new triaD; Giles v. Maryland, 386 US. 66,66-67 (1967) (remanding case to state court to hold
further hearings regarding prosecutors' knowing use of perjured testimony and suppressing
evidence favorable to the defendant).
65. VA. CONST. art. I, SS 8,11. Section 8 contains the defendant's right to notice, confrontation, and a speedy and public trial by jury. VA. CoT. art. I, 5 8. It also ensures against selfincrimination and double jeopardy, among other enumerated rights. Id Section 11 guarantees due
process of law, among other enumerated rights. VA. CONST. art. I, S11.
66. Brady 373 US. at 87. The snitchrrelated evidence requested in this motion should
indude the following: (1) anyconfessions or statements made bythe defendant or anyco-conspiratot, (2) names and addresses of all witnesses the prosecution plans to offer, (3) any statements to,
from, or between police officers in regard to anyalleged participants in the crime; (4) any statement
made by alleged co-conspirators which may be exculpatory to the defendant; (5) all records of
felony convictions, guilty verdicts, or juvenile adjudications of each witness; (6) all records of bad
acts byanywitness; (7) all consideration given to, expected, or hoped for bya witness (consideration
given a broad meaning of anything of subjective value to the witness; particularly leniency, clemency, favorable treatment, recommendations, or any assistance regarding pending or potential
disputes with a sovereign agency); (8) all threats, direct or indirect, made to potential witnesses; (9)
all other occasions when a witness has testified or spoken about the facts of the present case; (10)
all other occasions in which a witness has testified as an informer, accomplice, or co-conspirator,
(11) all documents of the police regarding a jailhouse informant; (12) all statements bythird parties
that would cast doubt on the jailhouse informant's testimony, (13) any statements by the jai ouse
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evidence favorable to the accused bythe prosecutor is a violation of due process
"where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good or bad faith of the prosecution."67 Because jailhouse snitch and
cooperating informant testimonyis inherentlyunreliable, the Bradythreshold for
this kind of evidence should be substantially low.
Next, judicial discretion as to defense witnesses could be invigorated. An
imbalance of power exists in the current system of criminal prosecutions. The
prosecution possesses meaningful resources with which it can entice and induce
witnesses to come forward on its behalf. It may promise leniency, immunity,
tied pleas in which a potential witness's husband or child may be granted leniency for the witness's testimony, conjugal visits, as well as other unspoken,
often hinted-at, deals.6" The defendant possesses no tools except an abstract
concept of fairness with which he may cajole favorable witnesses, meanwhile
competing with the Government's promised rewards. H Richard Uviller
proposed the exercise of a judicial power based on the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.69 Also, Uviller cites an inherent judicial power to offer immunity
or sentence reductions for cooperating witnesses who choose to appear on
behalf of the defense. 0 Immunitymaybe granted to a defense witness, accordinformant which are inconsistent with other statements; (14) all statements by the jailhouse
informant which are internally inconsistent; all information which would undermine the jailhouse
informant's testimony, including, to promises, inducements, or any other agreements; (15) records
of the jailhouse informant as a witness for the United States or the Commonwealth in other cases;
(16) any exculpatory information regarding jailhouse informants; (17) any competency hearing
reports regarding the jailhouse informant; (18) all pre-sentence reports when jailhouse informant
is the subject; all non-recorded oral statements made by the jailhouse informant to police; (19) any
information from other sources, particularlyotherprisoners or guards, that contradicts the jailhouse
informant's testimony, (20) any information from any party that jailhouse informants have a
propensity to le; any evidence that the jailhouse informant had personal animosity towards the
defendant; (21) details regarding the statement the jailhouse informant allegedly heard (facts such
as context, time, place, who started the conversation, etc.); (22) anyinformation about the relationship between the defendant and the jailouse informant; all information which indicates that the
testimonyof a prosecution witness is inconsistent with other information in the prosecution's actual
or constructive possession; and (23) anyinformation regarding promises, inducements, oranimosity
towards the defendant by any prosecution witness. MOTION FOR TIMELY DiScLOSURE OF
ExcVLPATORY EVIDENCE, aualieaT http.J/vc3.org/.

67. Brad); 373 US. at 87.

68. Interview with Roger D.Groot, Co-Chair,Capital Defense Workshop, inLexington, Va.
(Aug. 23, 2003).
69. H Richard Uviller,NoSafordxGaer ValualeCovidriaforHdpfid Ttinmyfn n
Cza,
ain 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 782-83 (2002) (contending that
Tainta Wtbsse; in C
defendants should be entitled to the benefit of witness compensation).
70. Id (citing Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F2d 964, 969-70 (3rd Gr. 1980)); seealsoBarry
Scheck, CkZigRvrks, 23 CARDOZOL. REV. 899,907 (2002) [hereinafter Scheck, Clai] (elaborating on ways a judge could exercise inherent power regarding jailhouse snitch or cooperating
witness testimony).
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ing to Smith, "once it is established ... that the conditions for such a remedy

have been satisfied." 7 These conditions limit the court's power to immunize
defense witnesses: "[TJhe defense witness must be available to testify, the
proffered testimonymust be clearlyexculpatory the testimonymust be essential;
and there must be no strong government interests which countervail against a
grant of immunity."72 A defense witness whose freedom is at stake is often too
scared of retribution to come forward and offer valuable exculpatory evidence.
Uviller's suggestions allow defense attorneys the opportunity to offer proof of
the exculpatoryvalue of their cooperator's testimony and give the judge discretion to grant immunity or a sentence reduction."
A workable rernedyfor the inherentlyunreliable testimonyproblemis being
used in Canada in the form of jury instructions.' The Vtnmx warning comes
from the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. u Vayorc.z In Vabma a
number of people were convicted of conspiracy to traffic in heroin.76 Because
much of the evidence against Vetrovec was accomplice testimony, the trial judge
warned the jury of the dangers of uncorroborated evidence given by an accomplice.77 Hearing the case on appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada created a
flexible rule that serves as a warning designed to prevent conviction based on
r The instruction gives the judge a great deal of discretion
unreliable testimony."
to decide whether the accomplice or informant is genuinely motivated or selfinterested. 9 If the judge finds that "the credit of the witness is such that the jury
should be cautioned, then he mayinstruct accordingly. If, on the other hand, he
believes the witness to be trustworth [sic], then regardless of whether the witness
is technicallyan 'accomplice,' no warning is necessary." " However, the Supreme
Court of Canada did go one step further, advising trial judges that "[wihat may
be appropriate, however, in some circumstances, is a clear and sharp warning to
attract the attention of the juror to the risks of adopting, without more, the
evidence of the witness.""' This warning became known as the Vetmuc
warning. 2 Later, the courts gave the Veoma warning addressing prosecution
71.
Snith, 615 F.2d at 971.
72. Id at 972.
Uviller, s"pra note 69, at 784.
73.
an th Rde qc QqDman and Irfmws, 23
mi
Pen
74.
See Steven Skurka, A Cxn
CARDozoL. REv. 759,760(2002) (discussing the Supreme Court of Canada's method of handling
snitch testimony through jury instructions or warnings).
75.
Id at 759; R. v. Vetrovec, [1982] 1 S.CKR 811.
76. Skurka, sup"a note 74, at 759.
77. R. v. Vetrovec, 1 S.CR. at 813-14.
Id at 830-32.
78.
79.
Seeid at 821-23 (stating that no arguments about the potential unreliabilityof accomplice
testimony can justify a hard and fast rule regarding its use).
80. Id at 823.
81.
Id at 831.
82.
Skurka, sup note 74, at 761.
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witnesses it deemed to be untrustworthy." The Supreme Court of Canada
further broadened the rule by noting circumstances under which the warning
should be given. 4 In 1996 the Ontario government created a commission to
investigate the wrongful murder conviction of GuyPaul Morin."5 The commission suggested that jailhouse snitches are almost always doubtful in their credibility and that the Vaenwc warning should emphasize that snitches are "almost
invariablymotivated byself-interest and that historicallysuch evidence has been
shown to be untruthful and to produce miscarriages of justice."8 6
B. Data Cdleaiw
1. D mg te Neefor Daa
As it now stands, there is no systematic collection of data regarding snitch
testimony. 7 Most of what is now known stems from anecdotal evidence."
Implementing a thorough system of data collection would help satisfy an acute
need for information in regard to the dangers of snitch testimony.
Solid evidence exists that shows the dangers of cooperative witnesses and
jailhouse snitches. Some of this evidence comes from the DNA exonerations
studied bythe BenjaminJ. Cardozo School of Law's Innocence Project. 9 Of the
first seventy exonerations studied, sixteen featured damaging snitch testimony
as a leading cause of the conviction.' This studyis one of the first in the United
States to examine wrongful convictions in a meaningful way." The drastic
nature of the results regarding snitch testimonysurprised even the authors.92 As

83. Id
84. ILv. Bevan, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 599.
85. Sklrka, sq"z note 74, at 761. Morin was exonerated of the murder of his nine-year-old
neighbor by DNA testing. Id Morin's conviction was heavily influenced by jailhouse snitch
testimonyregazding an alleged confession made to another inmate and heard bya second. Id Both
inmates testified at trial Id (citing HON. FRED KAUFMAN, THE COMMISSION ON PROCEEDINGS
INVOLVING GUY PAUL MORIN (ONTARIO MINISTRY OF THE ATIRNEY GENERAL 1998)
[hereinafter MORIN COMMISSION] at 1-4, http'J/www.attomeygeneraljus.gov.on.ca/english/
about/pubs/morin/morin-esumm.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2003)).
86. Id. at 762-63
(citing
MORIN COMMISSION,
at
634-35,
http://www.attorneygeneraltjus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/morin/morin ch3cd.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17,2003)).
87. Scheck Caib s"qtn note 70, at 900.
88.
Id
89. THE INNOCENCE PROJECr, CAUSES AND REMEDIES OF WRONGFUL CONVCIcONS, at
http://wwwanocenceproject.com/causes/index.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2003).
90. Id
91. S&gmIy BARRY Sc-EcK ET AL., ACrUAL INNOCENCE, (2000) (hereinafter SC2-EO
ET AL., AGTUAL INNOCENCE] (chronicling the multiple instances of wrongful convictions in the
United States).
92. Scheck, (2Zir supra note 70, at 900.
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only a minority of serious felonies involve DNA testing, there are likely to be
many more wrongful convictions, many based in part on snitch testimony."
In Canada, Guy Morin's exoneration led to the impaneling of the Morin
Commission which, after looking at jailhouse snitch evidence from Canada,
Great Britain, Australia, and the United States, concluded that cooperating
informants are notorious for their untruthfulness and are motivated largely by
self-interest.94 The Commission's report warned against the dangers of jailhouse
snitch testimony and recommended that trial judges be suspicious of such
evidence, but they were not to reject it outright." The United States government, as well as the state governments, must organize a study of the dangers of
snitch testimony. Privatelyfunded organizations such as The Innocence Project
cannot single-handedly collect data sufficient to studyproperlythe problem. A
nationwide and statewide effort, comparable to the Morin Commission, should
be implemented.
2. Data Cdlaion

There is currently no organization with sufficient means to collect and
analyze national data regarding cooperating informants and jailhouse snitches.96
Both The Innocence Project and the Morin Commission demonstrate effective
methods of data collection.9 The Morin Commission supplies a model for state
and federal governments designing systems of investigation and research into the
problems inherent in prosecutors' reliance on snitch testimony.98 The Innocence
Project also provides a model on a smaller scale." Professor Scheck suggested
the creation of "Innocence Commissions. " 1 These Innocence Commissions
93. Id at 901.
94. Skurka, supa note 74, at 762-63 (cng MORIN COMMISSION, at 555-60,
http://www.attorneygenenljus.gov.on.ca/english/aboupubs/morin/morin ch3ab.pdf;MORIN
COMMISSION, at 634-35, htp'J/www.attoneygeneraljus.gov.onca/enish/aout/pubs/morin/
morinch3cd.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2003)).
95. Id
96. Scheck, C(ai*wj supa note 70, at 900.
97. SegemUyMORIN COMISSION, http://www.attomeygenemlzjus.gov.on.ca/english/
about/pubs/morin (last visited Nov. 17, 2003) (gathering international data regarding Jailhouse
snitch testimony); THE IaNCENC PROJECT, at http-/www.innocenceproject.com (last visited
Nov. 17, 2003) (studying causes of wrongful convictions in DNA exonerations).
98. Segmy MORIN CMMSSION, http://www.attorneygeneraljus.gov.onca/english/
about/pubs/morin (last visited Nov. 17, 2003) (gathering international data regarding jailhouse
snitch testimony). See a/so Skurka, s"p-a note 74, at 762 (describing the Morin Commission's
gathering of international data involving the use of jailhouse snitch testimony); Scheck, G64ru s"1m
note 70, at 902 n.1 (alluding to Canada's success in creating models for wrongful conviction
inquiries).
99. See gmfdly THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, s"pu note 97 (studying causes of wrongful
convictions in DNA exonerations).
100. Scheck, Cai* swa note 70, at 902-03 (citing SCIECK ET AL, ACUAL INNOCENCE,
supranote 91, at 246, 260).
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would be state and federal institutions charged with investigating wrongful
convictions." These commissions would also be modeled after the Criminal
Case Review Commission in the United Kingdom ("CORC').' 2 The CRC
investigates claims of innocence.0 3
Professor Scheck would "[r]equire the official collection and reporting of
data on cases where newly discovered evidence of innocence is the basis for
overturning a conviction.""lHe also promotes the "[c]reattion] and fund[ing]
[of] Innocence Projects at law schools that will represent clients in DNA and
non-DNA cases," as well as the "[f]und["
[]of] teaching and research on
wrongful convictions, causes, and remedies."'I The goal of these Commissions
would be the collection of data to help both state and federal criminal justice
systems avoid wrongful convictions bymaking possible an understanding of how
the wrongful conviction occurred in the first place.'O' In the present system,
judges generally vacate convictions through one-line orders, so the onlywayto
gather information on these exonerations is through a thorough study of newspaper clippings."
The collection of post-trial data following acquittals could also assist in a
study of snitch testimony and its dangers. Prosecutors have the abilityto collect
data on cooperating witnesses or snitches who they believe lied at trial.'"8
Alternatively, there could be a system that enables defense attorneys to submit
a standing objection regarding the truthfulness of snitch testimony, either to the
prosecutors, the judiciary, or perhaps some neutral body designed for such
cases."° Prosecutors could also keep records on cases that do not proceed due
to their disbelief in the available snitch testimony."0 Prosecutors are in a much
better position to keep such records due to their relative wealth of resources and
information about the cases."' Each of these data collection methods would
help to uncover the prevalence and unreliability of cooperative witnesses and
snitch testimony, even in acquittals and trials that never went forward. This data
could supplement the data collected bythe federal and state Innocence Commissions.
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C Stmdural Ptr aia Rfom
A third method of solving the unreliabilityproblem of jailhouse snitch and
cooperative witness testimony is structural reform within the prosecutorial
agencies themselves. These reforms would enable prosecutors to deal more
effectively with the unreliable nature of cooperating witnesses and jailhouse
snitches. The prosecutor makes the decision to accept and use such testimony,
unwittingly spreading possibly false information into the criminal justice
system."' While not always blameworthy, prosecutors do have a special burden
113
to check this testimony, especially when the possibility of falsehood is high.
Due to mandatory minimums and the Guidelines, prosecutors have more
leverage than ever to induce cooperation."' The Innocence Project studies have
shown that the adversary system alone is not enough to correct the mistaken
judgments of prosecutors concerning the testimonyof cooperators and jailhouse
snitches."' No one, from defense attorneys to judges, law enforcement agents
to prosecutors, questions the proposition that the use of cooperative informant
116 However, prosecutors,
testimony is risky.
as well as the courts, firmly believe
that the use of informants is necessaryto obtain convictions."" Prosecutors are
in the best position to judge pre-trial the truth or falsity of a particular witness's
testimony.' Therefore, prosecutors do have a special dutyto ensure that the
information and testimony that they rely on is true.119
Prosecutors have an immense responsibility to ensure accurate testimony
from snitches. 2 ' It is important for the courts to require rigorous investigation
of snitches before their testimonyis used and to exercise close supervision of the
prosecutors' decisions to use such testimony. Heightened prosecutorial standards may involve a series of rules addressing how to handle snitch testimony
from a prosecutorial point of view. These rules should include the following:
(1)the testimony should be slightly discredited without corroborating evidence,
as long as the corroboration is not by another snitch; (2) the snitch's character
must be investigated for credibility issues, like an extensive criminal record, or
other disreputable behavior known to either the prosecutor or law enforcement
112.
See Cohen, stzpa note 22, at 825-26 (describing the prosecutor's role in the decision to
accept and utilize cooperative testimony).
113.
Id
114.
U.S. SENTENQNG GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1, sq note 14.
115.
Seegra/y THE INNOcENCE PROJECT, supra note 97 (demonstrating the number of
wrongful convictions, often aided by cooperative testimony, under the current adversarial system).
116.
Cohen, supra note 22, at 827.
117. Id
118.
Scheck, (2czir, supra note 70, at 903.
119.
Id
120.
S& Cohen, s"pra note 22, at 827 (stressing that those with responsibility, especially
prosecutors, take steps to "understand and guard against cooperating witnesses infecting criminal
investigations with lies and half-truths").
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agents; (3) the prosecutor must be reasonably certain of the veracity of the
snitch's statement; (4) a supervisorygroup must have final approval over the use
of snitch testimony, (5) if an accomplice, the snitch's relative culpability must be
established; (6) the court should closely scrutinize any deals with more culpable
defendants to the detriment of less culpable ones; (7) any deals with the informant must be disclosed to the defense as exculpatory Brady evidence; (8) if the
witness engages in criminal behavior then all deals should be revoked; and (9)
post-trial, jailhouse snitches and accomplice witnesses should be closely monitored and any dishonest behavior should be disclosed to the defense team.'
Often, despite the best efforts of the prosecution and defense, there is no
wayto tell when an informant is lying. At that point, his testimony is heard and
his deceit is undetected.'22 However, there are manycases in which prosecutors
uncover a snitch's lie.' These situations should be catalogued so prosecutors
in the future may use the catalog as a reference when faced with a questionable
witness. 24 Prosecutors' offices, especially United States Attorneys' Offices,
could also maintain a list detailing the following: "(1) the nature of the lie; (2) the
circumstances that led to the discovery of the deception; (3) the action, if any,
taken by the prosecutor after the discovery of the lie; and (4) the affect [sic] of
the false information on the investigation and prosecution." 2 ' This investigation
and record-keeping on the part of prosecutors will assist all parties in the criminal justice system to better understand the scope of the problem of jailhouse
snitch testimony.
D. Hdp Thrswma Unimr
- atreP, k jn Snib Teswno y
Due to the overwhelming proliferation of cooperative testimony and the
duty of the prosecutor to help curb its inherent risks, prosecutors must be
encouraged to consider the dangers of false testimony and to be trained in
methods to detect it. Prosecutors have the most exposure to these witnesses and
they make the offers in exchange for testimony. A heavy responsibility comes
with that power and it follows that the prosecution must tryto lessen the impact
of potentially false or misleading testimony.
For example, an independent board of senior prosecutors should be
employed to supervise and review all debriefing sessions with potential cooperating witnesses. 6 The prosecutor's office has an ethical responsibility to ade121.
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quately supervise the work of its lawyers." Assuming that prosecutors feel
enormous pressure to obtain convictions, coupled with their power to offer
incentives to jailhouse snitches, accomplices, and other cooperating witnesses,
it is imperative that there be some form of supervisory check on a prosecutor's
individual discretion.
Many prosecutors want to find the truth in a case and believe that finding
that truth is " '[a] matter of common sense.' "2 Many prosecutors believe
snitches because the information they provided was consistent with other
information already gathered. 9 In an interview of the Assistant United States
Attomeys ("AUSAs"), most of the participants believed they could tell which
witnesses were truthful. 30 Research shows that the average person can tell
whether they are being told the truth about 55% of the time, slightlyhigher than
a coin toss." Additionally, studies showthat the more confident one is that he
can tell the truth from a lie, the more likelyhe is incorrect.3 Police officers had,
on average, a 55.8% rate of accuracy, only barely higher than the 52.8% registered bycollege students.' This lack of accuracyin determining the truth does
not serve the prosecutorial goal of determining truth from lies very well However, schools exist that train law enforcement officers to tell when an individual
is telling the truth or lying.' Likewise, psychologists should train prosecutors
in lie detection for their debriefings with cooperating witnesses. 3 "People are
not good6 intuitive lie detectors, but it may well be possible to make them
3
better."'
Professor Scheck offers the idea of simulations within the prosecutors'
offices.1'3 During these simulations, prosecutors would attempt to tell whether
a subject is telling the truth or lying.1'3 Nothing could be more informative or
127. Id at 890 n64 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 5
11(1) (2000); sea/so MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSMBILTY DR 1-104(c) (1980) (stat ig that a
law firm shall adequately supervise the work of its partners, lawyers, and non-awyer employees);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUC R. 53(a) (1983) (statig that a partner in a law firm should
ensure that all lawyers in that firm adhere to the Model Rules.
128. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Gap mima td Faend Pmwam: Expenmw f Tn6-Tdhig and
Eraibnvgsraj 68 FORDHAMwith
L. REV.
917, 943 (1999) (quoting one of twent five anonymous
AI.LAs).
interviews author had taken
129. Id at 934 (stating that most of the twenty-five AUSAs believed that they obtained "most
of the truth-).
130. Id at 943-45.
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humbling to these professionals than feeling confident in their answers, often
based on years of experience, and getting it wrong.139 At the very least, these
simulations could provide prosecutors additional training in truth detection.
Finally, there needs to be stricter enforcement of ethical sanctions by the
appropriate disciplinary panels for abuses of prosecutorial discretion in the use
of cooperation testimony. Prosecutors feel an intense pressure to obtain a
conviction and, given their bargaining power under the Guidelines, the Brady
obligation is not a sufficient check on their discretion."4 A strong supervisory
hand and a real threat of discipline would check prosecutors' drive to convict
and their power to offer leniency in exchange for testimony.
V. Cnmin
The United States and Virginia continue to allow jailhouse snitch and
cooperating witness testimonyin criminal trials. Yet, this testimonyis inherently
unreliable due to the tremendous incentives for these witnesses to lie. This
practice cuts right to the heart of the truth-finding function of the criminal
justice system. The Guidelines and mandatory minimum sentences have caused
an age-old technique in trying criminal cases, the use of snitch testimony, to
increase beyond the natural check of the adversarial system. The dangers of
jailhouse snitch testimonyare particularlynotable in capital murder trials where
exoneration is impossible. Situations like that of Earl Bramblett should never
occur. Death is different, both practically and legally, and requires a higher
evidentiary standard of reliability.141 There needs to be more defense oriented
methods to deal with this problem. Data must be collected to gauge the extent
of the problem before it can be corrected. Finally, the prosecutorial systems
must reform themselves in order to contain a situation which often creates
injustice in criminal proceedings.
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